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Abstract Understanding patronage networks in Chinese Bureaucracy helps
us quantify promotion mechanism underlying autocratic political systems. Al-
though there are qualitative studies analyzing political promotions, few use
quantitative methods to model promotions and make inferences on the fitted
mathematical model. Using publicly available datasets, we implement network
analysis techniques to advance scholarly understanding of patronage networks
in autocratic regimes, using the Chinese bureaucracy as an example. Using
graph-based and non-graph-based features, we design three studies to examine
drivers of political promotions. We find that careers of politicians are closely
associated with their genders, home origins, and positions in the patronage
networks.
Keywords Social Network Analysis ¨ Political Promotion ¨ Patronage
Network ¨ Autocracy
1 Introduction
Interacting with others and forming connections are important skills among
top executives in large companies and government institutions. Previous liter-
ature qualitatively demonstrated that informal connections help employees go
around with formal constraints in large institutions [26]. How the patronage
network will affect promotions of politicians? What features of the network
play important roles in promotions? These are the questions on which we can
make several different arguments.
Analysis around political regime suffer from lacking of data. Unlike so-
cial data from social platforms, political database is quite limited. Applying
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data-mining methods on the publicly available data will enable researchers to
conduct quantitative studies in political science.
Previous literature mainly focused on the qualitative measurements of ef-
fects of patronage among China’s political elites. They often came from limited
insider sources [24]. As a result, these studies often ended up with theoreti-
cal speculations and thus lack statistical inferences. Although researchers used
the term network in political research [24], only a few scholars have applied
actual social network analysis (SNA) [14]. Studies pointed out that the term
network was used a a metaphor representing a group of people with special
ties [25]. The limited studies in patronage networks mainly focused on local
network features and tried to use network analysis to study current state of
Politburo behaviors. They did not try to use statistical tools to infer future
political characteristics based on those features [8].
We aim to combine the SNA with statistical techniques, specifically with
the goal of studying promotions in government institutions. Our study draw
lines across network analysis, statistical analysis and political promotions in
autocratic regimes. The insights will deepen our understanding of the struc-
tures of autocratic institutions, the patronage mechanism and the promotion
process.
In this paper, we applied social network analysis to the Chinese Political
Elite Database (CPED) dataset [13]. Our research began with the construc-
tions of three categories of networks - home origin, overlap-based patronage
and promotion-based patronage.
Then, we used regression models to find correlations between promotions
and both external and network features among Chinese politicians in our
dataset. In the study 1, we applied linear regression to find correlations be-
tween the promotion history of politicians and their direct superior. In other
studies, we analyzed the correlations between one’s political career and differ-
ent features from the network that were constructed. Our exploratory variables
included basic features from biographies and advanced features from networks,
such as node level features and structural level features. Finally, based on the
fitted results, we interpreted the fitted parameters from those models and try
to discover network features that were correlated with an politician’s promo-
tion in career.
2 Related Works
2.1 Patronage Effect
Patronage network plays an major role in regimes around the world, es-
pecially in China [5,17,13,26,14,8]. Previous studies demonstrated Guanxi,
which means patronage network in Chinese, plays a central role in promoting
employees in large institutions, such as private or public-owned companies and
government [13]. Likewise, researchers state that the patronage network of the
formal Prime Minister of China, Jiabao Wen was worth billions [6].
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Similarly, studies showed that the career promotions of politicians were
closely related to their relations with colleagues in the patronage network [13].
For instance, researchers in India pointed out that having close relationships
with one’s superiors would increase one’s chance of promotions [18]. Other
studies found that forming personal connections within institutions would help
employees get promotions and work around constraints [13]. We believe that
the effect of the patronage network on promotions could be longitudinal. In
other words, the promotion trajectory of a politician could be positively asso-
ciated with the promotion trajectory of his or her closely related connections
in the patronage network.
2.2 Social Network Analysis
Network Analysis has been used in different fields of research, including in-
formation science [20], kinship analysis [22], online service recommendations
[4], co-author citation analysis [12], gene-disease analysis [1] and online social
network analysis [19]. For example, researchers identified studies with similar
topics by applying graphical analysis on the co-author citation network. Like-
wise, by applying network analysis to gene-disease network, they learned how
genetic and environmental factors, such as drugs, contributed to diseases [1].
In social science, researcher used network analysis to study community
structures and predict structural appearances by incorporating machine learn-
ing techniques [16,7]. For instance, researchers proved that certain community
structures existed in the selected networks by studying the interactions be-
tween their components [16]. Similarly, recent literature stated that edges be-
tween nodes in the network could be predicted by combining machine learning
and network analysis in social network [7]. Current studies also showed that
graphs could be auto-generated by applying generative models with networks
analysis [27].
2.3 Features Extracted From Data
The promotion of a politician is determined by many external factors, such as
one’s work experience, genders, leadership skills, and economic growth of the
city [23]. For example, studies proved that there existed a gender bias in polit-
ical promotions [11]. Particularly in work-space promotions, researcher found
that, although the wage differences were not huge, female candidates had sig-
nificantly lower probabilities in promotions compared to the male candidates
[2].
Home origin is another external feature. Interpersonal distance is the psy-
chological term for measuring how close people are [10]. Studies proved that
people who came from the same country would have stronger bounds in social
networks [21]. In this case, we define two people to have the same home origin
if they come from the same city.
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2.4 Social Network Features
The patronage network will affect one’s promotion [14]. Previous studies have
shown that faction, for example, will affect a politician’s career. There are also
correlations between faction network, schooling network and home origin net-
work [14]. We will extract different network features from all the networks we
built, and test their correlations with politician’s trajectories. It will have node
level features, including degrees, n-hop features, and structural level features,
including role and motif detection.
3 Dataset
We use the Chinese Political Elite Database (CPED), a large biographical
database that contains extensive demographic and career information of over
4,000 key city, provincial and national leaders in China since late 1990s [13].
For each leader, the database provides information about the time, place,
organization, and rank of every job assignment listed in one’s curriculum vitae,
which is collected from government websites, yearbooks, and other trustworthy
Internet sources. The author matches each city-year spell in the panel data
set with a city secretary and a mayor. In cases where multiple leaders held the
same post within a given spell, the person with the latest entry date is chosen.
Fig. 1: Heatmap of hometown origin of all politicians in the dataset: Xinjiang
has 78 politicians.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of politicians in the dataset according to
their home origins. According to the results, we can see that the politicians
are distributed across the entire country. On the other hand, most of them are
from the east coast, whereas handful of politicians come from the middle of
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China. This maps with the population distribution in China. Table 1 shows
details about the dataset, including the counts of politician, province and city.
It contains the total count of data points in our work experience table.
Table 1: Detials about the politician dataset.
Item Count
Politician 4057
Province 32
City 389
Work Experience Data Points 62742
4 Network Definition
This section describes how we use the plain text dataset of Chinese politicians
to make our networks and graphs. We constructed three main networks to
simulate the patronage network in real life, including hometown origin net-
work, work experience overlap network and promotion network. The dataset
included 4057 politicians in total, which were considered in all three graphs as
nodes.
4.1 Home Origin Patronage Networks
The hometown network is highly clustered based where they come from. For
each city group, all nodes are completely connected. They all have the same
degrees.
We have 59306 edges within the network. Each edge represents that two
politicians come from the same city. We have two different networks con-
structed. For the first graph, two nodes are connected if they are from the
same city. For the second graph, two nodes are connected if they are from
the same city and they have worked together in the same department at some
point in their lives. To avoid unreadable visualization, we plot hometown net-
works for two cities as an example, shown in Figure 2. All the nodes within the
clusters are all inter-connected. The network on the right is less dense as we
restricted the network to only have an edge between those who have worked
together. As a result, many nodes are not connected. Some groups form strong
connections, as those politicians are from the same city and also share working
experiences.
4.2 Overlap-based Patronage Network
We next constructed a directed, weighted graph based on overlapping work
and school experiences of the 4,057 political leaders. We have 655,769 directed,
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Fig. 2: Left graph is the networks of politicians based on their home ori-
gins. This network is for all the politicians from two cities, Hangzhou(bottom
right) and Shangrao(top left). Right graph is the networks of politicians based
on their home origins and work experience. All these politicians are from
Hangzhou and share work experience.
weighted edges. Each edge in the network indicates the existence of at least one
overlapping work or school experience between the two leaders. We consider
an overlap if two have to work together for at least six months in the same
municipality in the same province. if multiple overlaps are founded, we encoded
into to edge weights, given by the total time of two working together. The
direction of an edge is determined by comparing which cadre is senior to the
other in terms of their average cadre level during the time periods they work
together. The node distribution plot in Figure 3 suggests that most nodes have
degrees between 100 and 1000.
Fig. 3: Left graph is node Degree Distribution. Right graph is two-hop Neigh-
bors Sub-graph of A Random Node 3507.
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The right graph in the Figure 3 shows the two-hop neighbors of a random
node 3057, named Zhao Zhuping, currently the head of a district in Shanghai,
whose rank is equivalent to a mayor in U.S. He has 22 patronage relationships
under our definition, way lower than average in our data-set. This is partly
because he is relatively young and serves only a moderate position in the
bureaucratic system.
We plot node similarity graph between this node 3507 and all others to see
how typical this node is and what roles other node have. The plots in Figure
Fig. 4: The Graph is the node similarity distribution between Node 3507 and
All Other Nodes.
4 show that most of the nodes are almost identical to node 3507, possibly
because the network is so dense that the basic feature aggregation was able to
capture the entire graph. We also generated one-hop and two-hop similarity
distributions. These two plots also show very clearly that the vast majority of
nodes are similar, which is suggesting the sub-graph we drew earlier for Node
3507 is highly representative across all nodes in spite of their differences in
node degrees.
4.3 Promotion-based Patronage Network
Our third graph models patronage relationship network using political ap-
pointments among leaders.
There are in total 3905 directed edges in the network. An edge exists be-
tween two nodes when there exists a patron-client link. A patron-client link
from A to B forms when A is promoted by B. In our case, two nodes are con-
nected if one node is promoted by another. Specifically, we look at promotion
from rank level 4 to 5 based on the CPED dataset. The promotion between
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level 4 and 5 is considered as a milestone in one’s political career. [13]. The
edge goes from the node being promoted to the its promoter. This network is
not weighted because we are only considering one promotion. To construct
Fig. 5: Visualization of entire patronage network on the top, with a subset of
it zoomed in to show clear edges between nodes.
Fig. 6: Subgraphs with randomly chosen nodes and their edges.
Figure 6, we randomly selected 30 nodes and drew out their egonets. We in-
cluded all of the node’s one-hop neighbors. Based on the outputs, we observe
three most common structures, as shown in Figure 6.
The left subgraph shows that the node has two outgoing edges and many
incoming edges. In our graph, a node can have at most two out-neighbors, be-
cause the dataset is constructed in a way that a leader can have at most two
direct promoters. The node in the middle subgraph has no incoming edges,
possibly because it has not reached a level that can promote others. Another
common structure is shown in the right subgraph, namely, the node has only
incoming edges but it has a great number of them. As shown in Figure 7, the
cosine similarity between node 1568 and other nodes reaches spikes between
0.0 and 0.5, and 0.95 and 1.0, meaning that the most of the nodes are ei-
ther identical to this node or completely different from this node. There are
approximately 1400 identical nodes.
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Fig. 7: Left graph is the node similarity distribution between Node 1568 and
All Other Nodes (Two-hop features).
5 Method
5.1 Study 1: Predicting Cadre Final Rank Using Network Features
Beyond descriptive inference, our first attempt for predictive analysis is to look
at the extent to which network features predict final career result for leaders.
Our baseline model is as simple as follows:
Rank 9 α` βVNodeFeatures ` γCcovariates `  (1)
The outcome final rank is a leader’s cadre level, which is one’s political level in
Chinese government, at 2015. For a node feature vector, we use node’s feature
vector up to two-hop aggregation, which is a vector of length 27. We control for
one’s birth year, year of joining the communist party, and year of promotion
to municipality-level, which is rank 5, to adjust making comparisons across
different stages of cadres’ life and career.
5.2 Study 2: Detecting Political Factions
For this study, we analyze the effects of gender and home origin on political
factions. We use all three networks in this study. For the overlap-based pa-
tronage network, we down-grade the network by removing the edge weights
and directions. We assume that if two politicians have worked together, they
are closely related.
5.2.1 Gender Effect
For each network, we define the total degree of each nodes as the sum of in-
going edges and out-going edges.
Di “
ÿ
in
epj, iq `
ÿ
out
epi, jq (2)
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All the edges are undirected. For each graph, we define the proportion of nodes
given a total degree as the number of nodes with a given total degree divided
by the total number of nodes in the network. We look at gender differences
in terms of the total degrees of nodes in the overlap-based patronage network
and promotion-based network.
We also define the rankings for all the politicians to be integers ranging
from 1 to 9, with 9 being the highest level, the national leaders (Zhen guo ji).
We define politicians with level above 7 as a high rank politicians, or politi-
cal elites. For each node in our networks, we define a term average ranks of
neighbors as the average ranking of all 1-hop neighbors of the node.
NbrRanku “ 1|Nbrpuq|
ÿ
vPNbrpuq
Rankpvq (3)
We look at the differences of the counts between male and female high rank
politicians and compare the differences of average ranks of neighbors among
male and female politicians.
5.2.2 Home Origin Effect
We use overlap-based patronage network to analyze home origin effects on
political networks. After the network is down-graded, we embedded all nodes
into vectors using node2vec [9].
node2vec works by carrying out a number of random walks from each
node in the graph, where the walks are parameterized by p and q. In order
to validate that people with same home origin have stronger connections in
the graph, we used the BFS approach for node2vec by setting the exploring
parameters. More precisely, after having just traversed the edge from node
node t to node v, the un-normalized transition probability of travelling from
node v to a neighboring node x is given by:
αpqpt, xq “
$’’&’’%
1, if dtx “ 0
1, if dtx “ 1
2, if dtx “ 2
(4)
We sample 10% of nodes from the original graph before running node2vec. We
calculate two lists of scores for each node: In Set Similarity Scores and Out Set
Similarity Scores. The scores are calculated by taking the dot product of the
embeded vectors of two nodes. Two nodes are considered as an In Set pair if
they are from the same province. For example, if two politicians are both from
Shanghai, their similarity score, which is the dot product between two node
vectors, would be added in to the In Set Similarity Scores for that node. Then,
we explore at the province level. For each province, we iterate through every
politician from that province and concatenate their In Set Similarity Scores
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 11
and Out Set Similarity Scores. We then define the average scores within the
province as the average of each list as following:
scoreu “ 1|provinceu|
ÿ
pPprovinceu
scorep (5)
provinceu is the set of politicians in that province. score can be either within
or inter-province scores. We compare those two scores to validate the effect of
home origin in political networks.
5.2.3 Bridging Candidates Effect
After assigning nodes to different groups, we define the groups as cliques. For
each node, we define within-clique edge count as the count of edges that a
node has, to the nodes that are within the same clique as itself. Similarly, we
define the term between-clique edge count as the count of edges that a node
has, connecting to the nodes that were in different cliques from itself.
We investigate the correlations between the within-clique edge count, between-
clique edge count and rankings of politicians.
5.3 Study 3: Hubs and Authorities
In this study, we use the Hyperlink-Induced Topic Search (HITS) algorithm
to explore the hubs and authorities among two of our patronage networks,
namely, overlap-based and promotion-based networks.
HITS algorithm is an algorithm used to analyze web links. It defines two
types of Web pages and calls them hubs and authorities. The authorities web
pages are usually prominent sources for a specific question or content. These
pages are given high authority scores. On the other hand, the hubs are those
that link to authority pages and act as a guide to other authority pages, usually
those with a high authority scores. These Web pages are given high hub scores
[15].
From the dataset, we extract the rank that every political leader is at the
end year of this dataset. The end year is defined as 2015 or the year they
retire. We defined the rank as the final rank of the politician. Every political
leader has a final rank ranging from 0 to 9. We then calculate the hub and
authority scores for both networks, and plot the scores against final ranks,
trying to identify correlation. Scatter plot is used to show a general structure.
For every rank, we take the average score of all political leaders of that rank
and plot the average score on top of the scatter graph. Then we fit a linear
line of the average scores against final ranks.
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6 Results
6.1 Study 1: Predicting Cadre Final Rank Using Network Features
Our preliminary ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model yielded a R2
of 0.625, suggesting 62.5% of the variation in cadre final ranks are captured by
our explanatory variables. Then we evaluated our baseline model’s prediction
power on in-sample and out-of-sample performances. For out-of-sample, we
held out 10% of the data, estimate model on the other 90%, and test model on
the 10% for cross validation. Thus, our out-of-sample prediction was averaged
over all 10 hold-out sessions. Accuracy was measured by the percentage of
correct predictions of the final ranks of politicians.
Table 2: In-Sample and Out-of-sample prediction performances of OLS regres-
sion model.
Accuracy
In Sample Predictions 0.721
Out of Sample Predictions 0.718
The closeness of the accuracy results suggested that we are not over-fitting
and we had a solid baseline results to start. We then fitted the data using
more complex model, ordinal logistic regression (OLR).
P pYi “ jq “ exppτj ´Xβq
1` exppτj ´Xβq ´
exppτj´1 ´Xβq
1` exppτj´1 ´Xβq (6)
Assuming,
Y „ Multinomial(1, pi)
Y
˚ “ Xβ ` 
Y
˚ “ Y pτjq
j „iid logistic
Here Yi is the rank outcome for each leader, and j is from 0 to 9 (10 levels
of cadre rank), and X is feature vector up to two-hop aggregation and years
of birth, joining party, and promotion, same as those in OLS. Results below
suggest pooled OLS perform better than the multi-nomial logit model.
Table 3: In-Sample and Out-of-sample prediction performances of pooled OLR
regression model.
Accuracy
In Sample Predictions 0.666
Out of Sample Predictions 0.649
Then, we used early-stage patronage network information to predict lead-
ers’ career outcome in the end. Specifically, we experimented with using net-
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 13
work structures up until 2005-07-01 to predict cadre ranks ten years later, on
2015-07-01.
Using similar specifications as above for OLS and OLR, except for holding
off rank information post 2005, we obtained the the results in the following
table.
Table 4: In-Sample and Out-of-sample prediction performances on early-stage
patronage network.
Accuracy
In Sample Predictions (OLS) 0.690
Out of Sample Predictions (OLS) 0.683
In Sample Predictions (Logit) 0.725
Out of Sample Predictions (Logit) 0.720
Results above show that we have about 2.5 percentage points increase in
accuracy from the OLS model, and almost no gain for the logit model. This
suggests node features covering 2005 to 2015 add no gain to our prediction
power. Network structures after 2005 are even noisier in predicting career
outcome in 2015.
To make sure our test suffer less from model specification or baseline re-
sults, we further regressed outcome solely on node feature variables, without
adding any other co-variants and outcome on nothing with the interception
only. The results are showed below.
Table 5: In-Sample and Out-of-sample prediction performances excluding
other co-variants.
Accuracy
In Sample Predictions (OLS) 0.581
Out of Sample Predictions (OLS) 0.575
6.2 Study 2: Detecting Political Factions
6.2.1 Home origin distribution of top rank politicians
According to the hometown network, we found that some provinces have larger
population of politicians, some less. Combining with the ranking information,
we plotted out the home origin distribution, in province level, for top ranked
politicians.
We found that all the top ranked politicians are from northeastern regions
of China, and they are from regions close to the pacific east. These results are
correlated to the gross domestic product distributions across the country [3],
shown in Figure 10 (t “ ´2.11, p “ 0.03).
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Fig. 8: Left is the top 10 home origin (province) distribution of the top politi-
cians: for example, we have 56 politicians ranked in minister level from Hubei
Province; Right is the gross domestic product distribution of 10 top rank
provinces: for example, Hubei has 3596 dollars as its gross domestic product.
6.2.2 Gender And Connectivity
We calculated degree distributions for male and female candidates (t “ ´2.12,
p “ 0.03). Figure 9 showed that the average degrees of male and female politi-
cians were close (µmale “ 341.81, µfemale “ 390.68). The female politicians
had higher average degrees. However, we have more high connected male politi-
cians than female politicians.
Fig. 9: Left is the degree distributions for male and female politicians. Right
is the box plot for the degree distributions.
6.2.3 Gender And Rankings
We calculated the ranking differences between male and female politicians.
Ranking distributions of male and female candidates are different. Similar
to what we had for the degree distributions, the average rankings of female
politicians was higher than that of male. However, we have more high ranked
male politicians than female politicians.
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Fig. 10: Left is the box plot for the ranking distributions for male and female
politicians. Right is the box plot for the ranking distributions of neighbors for
male and female politicians.
Likewise, we calculated the average rankings for the closest neighbors of
male and female candidates (t “ 3.40, p “ 0.0067). The trend was the same.
6.2.4 Home Origin And Similarity
The similarity score from node2vec showed politicians from the same home
origin had tighter connections in general (t “ ´1.19, p “ 0.24).
Fig. 11: Left is the similarity score distributions for different hometown and
same hometown groups. Right is the With-in clique and Inter-clique clique ra-
tio with respect to the level rankings of the politicians. Level 9 is corresponding
to the level of the president.
In our case, hometown represented the province the politician came from.
More than 70% of the cases, politicians from the same hometown had higher
connectives in the node2vec embedded space. We have politicians from Shanghai
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stood out as an outlier. The average within hometown community similarity
score was 2.37. This means politicians from Shanghai tended to have stronger
connections during their careers.
6.2.5 Within Clique And Inter-clique Connectivity
For this study, we defined that two politicians came from the same clique if they
had the same home origin. Based on our (work experience) overlapping graph,
we defined with-in clique connectivity as the count of edges going out from one
node to other nodes who had the same home origin attribute. Similarly, we
defined inter clique connectivity as the count of edges going out from one node
to other nodes that had different home origin attribute. We then calculated the
with-in clique and inter clique edge count ratio for each node. We plotted the
ratio against the ranking level of a node. We only took nodes that had ranking
level greater than 5, since they were considered as high ranking politicians.
We limited the ratio from 0 to 30, since for any nodes with ratio above 30, we
could consider that they only had with-in clique edges.
In the plot, we have ranking levels ranging from level 5 to level 10. Level 5
is the equivalent level for the state Governor. Level 10 is the presidential level.
We can see that there is a big jump in the clique ratio from level 5 to level 6
(t “ 10.69, p ď 0.01). We can see the from level 7 to level 8, there is no jump
(t “ 0.71, p “ 0.48).
6.3 Study 3: Hubs and Authorities
We generated four graphs based on the two networks. Shown in Figure 12,
the scatter plot for the Promotion-based Network indicates that different rank
groups may correspond to hubs and authorities. However, the average score
of every rank does not show such relationship. Both of the hub graph and
authority graph show rather flat lines for the average score, which indicates
that no significant correlation is found in the Promotion-based Network.
The Overlap-based Network, however, shows different structures. A sur-
prising finding from the hub and authority graph is that they seem to be very
similar. We explore the actual number of the scores and find that the hub and
authority scores for almost every political leader are exactly the same before
five decimals after the decimal point and only differ after that. Based on Figure
13, both of the scatter plot and the average line show some correlation between
the final rank and the hub/authority scores. Because of the similarity of both
graphs, we only fit one of the graphs and believe it will be almost identical
for the other one. The fitted line is shown in black on the right subgraph of
Figure 13, and the statistics is shown below in the table.
As shown in the table, there is a clear and significant correlation between
the authority scores and the final rank of a political leader, indicated by the
small p-value. We can say that the authority score increases as the final rank
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Fig. 12: Left is the hub scores as a function of final ranks of the political leaders
based on the Overlap-based Patronage Network. Right is the authority scores
as a function of final ranks of the political leaders based on the Overlap-based
Patronage Network.
Fig. 13: Left is the hub scores as a function of final ranks of the political
leaders based on the Promotion-based Patronage Network. Right is the au-
thority scores as a function of final ranks of the political leaders based on the
Promotion-based Patronage Network.
goes up for a political leader. Other statistics are reported as the following:
(F(1,8) = 30.74, RSE = 0.005821, Adjusted R2 = 0.7677)
7 Discussion and Implication
In our first study, we found that career outcome of political leaders in China
is largely determined by patronage networks formed early in career, mostly
even before promotion to municipality-level positions. It suggested that our
network features up until 2005 adds strong prediction power to the model,
implying that Chinese cadre’s patronage relationships early in career may
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Table 6: The correlation between the authority scores and the final rank of
politicians in the network.
Dependent variable:
Authority Score
Final Rank Of A Political Leader 0.00355˚˚
(0.00064)
(Intercept) -0.00556.
(0.00342)
Observations 10
Note: .pă0.15; ˚pă0.05; ˚˚pă0.005
matter much more than we previously thought. The strong and substantial
implication here is not causal and we certainly do not claim exhaustive in
capturing factors determining career outcomes with around 70% of accuracy in
prediction. Nonetheless, our finding points to an interesting pattern that one’s
political career is largely arranged and destined by factors in her early years,
be it overlapping work experience or other pre-determined features. Future
research can do two things: (1) to figure out better ways of represent network
features to make better predictions, e.g. Random Walks, Node Centrality, etc.
Our current representation uses simple aggregation of neighborhood node basic
features; (2) to explore mechanisms and factors that causally determine one’s
early career trajectory.
Our results from the home origin studies showed that the final ranking of
a politician is highly correlated with the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of
one’s home origin. This is not surprising, as we believe that higher GDP will
bring a politician more resources and connections compared to a politician
from a rural city in China.
We found that the average ranking of female candidates is similar to the
average rankings of male. However, there were drastically more male politicians
in high-ups. This results coincided the stereotype of the gender differences in
political institution. Currently, we do not have a woman among all the highest
level politicians in China. These results suggested that female politician would
have lower chance to get promoted in autocratic countries, such as China. We
found the same gender differences in degree distribution as well.
We studied the closeness in overlap network of nodes that are from the same
home origin. We found more than half of the cases, politicians with the same
home origin had higher connectives in the work overlapping network. People
that were from the same hometown tended to work together. We found that
Shanghai had a much higher score in this case, comparing to other cities. This
suggested politicians from Shanghai focused more on patronage relationships
in political promotions.
We found politicians with higher rankings tended to have more out-clique
connections. There is a big jump between level 5 and level 6. Level 5 politicians
work at a state level, whereas level 6 is above state level. Our model suggested
that a politician forms more out-clique connections, especially after Level 6,
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which makes sense in that politicians work with people from other cities and
provinces after they are promoted to a national level.
In study 3, we analyzed the hub and authority scores for both the overlap-
based and promotion-based networks. Our plot shows no clear correlation be-
tween the scores and final ranks on the promotion-based networks. This is
due to how the promotion-based network is set up. When constructing the
network, we only considered a promotee’s direct superior to be his or her pro-
moter. Higher ranked politicians are not included, which explains the lack of
correlation on this graph. However, a positive linear relationship is shown on
the overlap-based network. As a politician’s final rank goes up, the politician
tends to be more central in the network, and thus have higher HITS scores,
both in terms of having more important connections and in terms of having
higher authorities.
Lastly but certainly not the least, our overall analysis of patronage network
information from various aspects yields a great deal of understanding for ca-
reer outcome of Chinese political leaders. Again, by simply looking at the early
10-year overlapping work experience, we were able to predict career outcomes
ten years later, at an accuracy level of around 70%. This is simply amazing
because the Chinese official line of cadre promotion is based on economic and
governance performance, so does a major stream of literature argue. We show
that patronage network, if not overwhelmingly, largely determines career lad-
der, and thus performance is either a second-order factor or a channel variable
through which patronage factor translate itself into career outcome, i.e. politi-
cians with better patronage relationships are assigned to regions and positions
that are more likely to yield better economic performance.
8 Limitations
In this study, we did not exhaust the list of factors that could play a role in
political promotions. In the home origin study, we only look at candidates that
are from same city. The scope of a city might be too large for defining close
relationships. Future studies may consider narrowing down the definition of
home origin between politicians with a larger dataset.
Likewise, for the promotion network, we only considered the promotion
between level 4 and level 5. Future researchers could explore the dataset to in-
clude patronage relationships incurred from every promotion during a leader’s
political career. Other researchers could also explore other methods in rep-
resenting network structures into vectors, and conduct finer-grained research
into mechanisms through which these patronage networks translate into career
outcomes.
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9 Conclusion
In this paper, we used network analysis techniques and statistical tools to
understand the mechanism behind promotions in autocratic political systems.
Specifically, we focused on the interpretations of the patronage network.
By using social network analysis on the three constructed networks, we
found associations between the final rank of a politician and one’s early stage
patronage connections. We found that early stage development in the patron-
age network plays a more important role in one’s political career compared
to a more current stage. We have found the correlations between the gender
and the final rankings, as well as the connectives. Our result also suggested
that politicians from same hometown tend to be much closer in the patronage
network. On the other hand, our results showed that in order to jump from
state level position to above, one needs more out of hometown connections.
Similarly, we demonstrated that hub and authority scores are direct mappings
of political rankings in the patronage network.
In conclusion, our study presented a new approach to analysis patronage
relationship in autocratic political system using publicly available promotion
records. Combining network analysis and statistical analysis, we were able to
quantify the promotion mechanism which was long thought to be mysterious
in autocratic government. We found that our results coincide with theoretical
speculations from previous qualitative studies, which came from limited insider
sources. We provide a new way to further quantify the promotions of autocratic
political systems using publicly available data.
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